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The modern approach to monetary policy stresses the importance of
guiding and inﬂuencing the public’s expectations about future central
bank actions. In this forward-looking view of monetary policy, the current
setting of the policy interest rate, which is an overnight or very short-term
rate, is on its own of little importance for private agents’ decisions about
consumption, investment, labor supply, and price setting. Instead, those
decisions are more importantly driven by expectations of futureshort rates,
especially as embodied in longer-term interest rates and other asset prices
(along with the appropriate adjustments for risk). That is, the current pol-
icy rate is most relevant to the extent it conveys information about future
policy settings and inﬂuences longer-maturity interest rates. Accordingly,
at its core, monetary policy can be considered a process of shaping the en-
tire yield curve of interest rates in order to achieve various macroeconomic
objectives.
The crucial role that private-sector interest rate expectations play in
macroeconomic stabilization naturally raises the question: how can cen-
tral banks best guide private expectations of future monetary policy ac-
tions? In the past, central bankers typically assumed that the accumulated
record of their past policy actions was the best means of such communi-
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by examining past policy behavior, could uncover a systematic policy pat-
tern or rule that would be useful in predicting future policy actions. Re-
cently, however, there is a new appreciation of the value of good commu-
nication as an accompaniment to good policy actions, and, as a result,
some central banks have started to place more importance on signaling
their intentions for future policy. In practice, much of this central bank
signaling of future policy intentions is implicit or indirect—essentially, a
process of suggesting the future policy path by revealing information
other than the future policy path. For example, some inﬂation-targeting
central banks provide descriptions of their macroeconomic models and
objectives as well as their current assessments of the state of the economy,
but it is left to the public to infer the future policy path that is consistent
with this information. A common such communication strategy is to pub-
lish an economic projection that is based on the assumption that the pol-
icy interest rate will not change in the future from its current setting.
Private agents must then compare this constant interest rate projection to
the announced economic objectives in order to back out the actual ex-
pected policy rate path. For example, if, at some future date, the published
constant interest rate inﬂation projection is higher (lower) than the inﬂa-
tion target, then, in general, private agents should infer that the policy rate
is likely to increase (decrease). This implicit signaling procedure has been
criticized for supplying a circuitous, vague, and potentially confusing
expression of the central bank’s actual views of the likely path of policy.1
Despite these criticisms, a published constant interest rate economic pro-
jection remains a key component of many central bank communication
strategies.
Implicit signaling remains widespread among central banks because
nearly all of them are extremely reluctant to directly reveal their views on
likely future policy actions. Indeed, one of the strongest central banking
taboos is the prohibition against talking publicly about future interest rates
(Faust and Leeper 2005). This taboo largely arises from the belief that ﬁ-
nancial markets would tend to interpret any central bank statements about
the likely future path of policy as commitments to future action, as op-
posed to projections based on existing information and subject to consid-
erable change. Thus, many central banks will at best only give indirect hints
or use coded language about policy inclinations in order to retain a plaus-
ible deniability in case markets are disappointed as the future unfolds.
Although the expected future path of the policy rate remains a closely
guarded secret at most central banks, a few have recently provided some di-
rect signals to the public about their policy intentions. Notably, in 2003, the
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1. For discussion and critiques of this communication strategy, see Rudebusch and Svens-
son (1999), Goodhart (2001), Leitemo (2003), Svensson (2005b), Faust and Leeper (2005),
and Woodford (2005).U.S. Federal Reserve, or more speciﬁcally the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC), started to issue statements commenting on the future
path of its policy rate. These verbal forward-looking policy inclinations, in-
cluding, for example, the famous phrase, “policy accommodation can be
removed at a pace that is likely to be measured,” have been considered in
central banking circles unusually explicit statements about the future path
of policy, even though the phrasing is far from unambiguous. A much
bolder step than the FOMC’s direct verbal signaling has been taken by the
central banks of New Zealand and Norway (the RBNZ and the Norges
Bank, respectively), which now publish numerical forecasts of the future
path of the policy interest rate. These public quantitative policy rate pro-
jections represent a dramatic change from the past communication prac-
tices of central banks. However, while direct signaling of policy inclina-
tions—whether verbal or quantitative—has been more prevalent in recent
years, its future use remains quite contentious and uncertain. Indeed, as 
a practical matter, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis President William
Poole (2005a) has stated that “the most important communications issue
facing the FOMC currently is whether and how to continue to provide for-
ward guidance on policy decisions.”
More broadly, among central bank and academic researchers, there is an
ongoing debate about the value of greater transparency and especially the
provision of direct signals of the future interest rate path. There may be po-
litical beneﬁts obtained from such transparency, such as greater accounta-
bility and legitimacy; however, the main argument in favor of directly com-
municating the central bank’s view of the most likely future policy path is
an economic one that is based on the beneﬁts of sharing central bank in-
formation with private economic agents. As the current Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke (2004) has suggested, “FOMC communication
can help inform the public’s expectations of the future course of short-term
interest rates, providing the Committee with increased inﬂuence over
longer-term rates and hence a greater ability to achieve its macroeconomic
objectives.” This view is supported by research that argues that FOMC
statements do aﬀect ﬁnancial markets and can alter expectations about the
future course of policy (e.g., Kohn and Sack 2004; Bernanke, Reinhart,
and Sack 2004; and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2005a). However, the
large research literature on transparency is only a partial buttress for this
argument. The theoretical literature has obtained conﬂicting results on the
value of transparency, depending on the exact details of the modeling spec-
iﬁcation.2 In addition, this literature has not focused on the issue of the
eﬀectiveness of explicit future policy signals for enhancing macroeco-
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2. The literature on central bank transparency is summarized in Geraats (2002), Carpenter
(2004), and Woodford (2005). As discussed in the following, a key dissent on the value of
transparency is Morris and Shin (2002, 2005) who argue that, in certain circumstances,
greater central bank transparency may lead to less private-sector information gathering and
reduced welfare.nomic stabilization.3 In the next section, we describe in more detail the
real-world direct signaling of policy inclinations by central banks and out-
line some of the arguments for and against such transparency.
The unresolved debate among central bankers and researchers about
the value of the direct signaling of policy intentions provides the key mo-
tivation for our formal analysis. In sections 6.3 and 6.4, we examine the
macroeconomic eﬀects of direct revelation of a central bank’s expectations
about the future path of the policy rate in a small theoretical model in
which private agents have imperfect information about the determination
of monetary policy. In particular, we focus on an issue that has received rel-
atively little attention in the literature, namely, the desirability of central
bank transparency about the expected path of policy when the public is
uncertain about the central bank’s preferences and, therefore, the future
path of policy. We show that publication of interest rate projections better
aligns the expectations of the public and the central bank in the spirit of
Bernanke’s quote in the preceding. Thus, publishing interest rate projec-
tions facilitates the management of expectations and the yield curve. We
then show that, under reasonable conditions, improving the alignment of
expectations also helps the central bank better meet its goals, providing
support for full central bank transparency.
6.2 The Revelation of Policy Inclinations by Central Banks
As background for our formal analysis of direct central bank signaling
of the likely future path of the policy interest rate, it will be useful to de-
scribe brieﬂy some actual instances of such central bank communication
and consider the arguments that have been made for and against the pro-
vision of these signals.
6.2.1 Recent Examples of Direct Policy Signaling by Central Banks
Some of the most intriguing direct signals of future policy inclinations
have been contained in statements issued by the Federal Reserve following
FOMC meetings, and it is useful to describe in detail some of this recent
history. At times, the FOMC policy statements have provided direct verbal
indications of the expected path of policy, which is quite unusual given the
Fed’s historical secrecy about the setting of the policy rate. Indeed, it was
just over a decade ago, in July 1995, that the Fed ﬁrst even announced a
contemporaneous numerical level for the target federal funds rate.4 An-
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3. An important exception is Faust and Leeper (2005), who examine central bank interest
rate projections. More generally, Svensson (1997) and Geraats (2005) discuss the value of cen-
tral bank inﬂation and output forecasts.
4. The ﬁrst policy announcement following an FOMC meeting occurred in February 1994
and only vaguely noted that “the FOMC decided to increase slightly the degree of pressure
on reserve positions.” In July 1995, the policy statement noted that the decrease in reserve
pressures would also be reﬂected in “a 25 basis point decline in the federal funds rate.” Rude-other example of the Fed’s reticence to reveal policy rate information is il-
lustrated in its semiannual Monetary Policy Report. For over two decades,
Fed policymakers have been surveyed internally about the economic out-
look on a semiannual basis and have been asked to provide macroeco-
nomic forecasts based on their individual views of an “appropriate” (pre-
sumably an optimal) future path for the policy interest rate.5 The ranges
and central tendencies of the resulting inﬂation, output, and unemploy-
ment forecasts are released to the public; however, the underlying condi-
tioning policy paths are not published and, indeed, are not even collected
from the survey participants. A similar secrecy applies to forecasts pre-
pared by the staﬀof the Federal Reserve Board, which are distinct from the
policymakers’ own views. These detailed projections are circulated inter-
nally before each FOMC meeting in the so-called Greenbook and are
made public with a ﬁve-year lag. Still, although over 100 economic series
are projected, the underlying staﬀ forecast for the policy rate (the federal
funds rate) is not tabulated.6
In general, Fed policymakers’ views on the future policy path have been
so closely guarded that they were only rarely even discussed internally. One
exception occurred from 1983 to 1999, when the FOMC voted not only on
the current setting of the policy interest rate but also on the expected di-
rection of future changes in the stance of policy over the very near term—
strictly speaking, over the “intermeeting period,” the approximately six-
week interval until the next meeting.7These future policy inclinations were
known as the policy “tilt” or “bias.” An “asymmetric bias” meant that the
FOMC judged that a policy move in one direction was more likely than in
the other, while a “symmetric” judgment meant that the next policy move
was equally likely to be up or down. Information about the policy bias was
contained in the operational instructions or “domestic policy directive”
sent to the trading desk at the New York Fed. Before May 1999, each di-
rective was only released to the public after the next FOMC meeting, so,
when released, the directive was, strictly speaking, outdated and of limited
use to markets.8 Following the FOMC meeting in May 1999, as well as af-
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busch (1995) described some of the diﬃculties in inferring even the ex post level of the federal
funds rate target before 1994. Of course, changes in the discount rate, which is an adminis-
tered interest rate, have always been announced.
5. These economic forecasts are summarized in the Fed’s Monetary Policy Report to Con-
gress, which was originally required by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of
1978.
6. Similarly, the research staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco frequently
publish their forecasts for various economic series but never for the federal funds rate.
7. Especially in the 1990s, the relevant horizon was often interpreted as a longer period,
which, as noted in the following, led to some confusion. Thornton and Wheelock (2000) pro-
vide a fascinating history of the policy bias and its interpretation.
8. The secrecy of the directive was the subject of a famous Freedom of Information com-
plaint that came before the U.S. Supreme Court. As described by Goodfriend (1986, p 71),
one of the reasons given defending the need for the secrecy of the directive was, “The FOMC
does not wish to precommit its future policy actions and current disclosure of the directive
would tend to precommit the FOMC.”ter the subsequent ﬁve meetings that year, the post-meeting policy state-
ment explicitly announced the expected future direction of policy as con-
tained in the directive. The relevant forward-looking language from these
1999 statements is shown in the ﬁrst several rows of table 6.1. For example,
after the October 5, 1999, meeting, the policy statement noted that “the
Committee adopted a directive that was biased toward a possible ﬁrming
of policy going forward.”
The Fed’s ﬁrst attempt at directly signaling the direction of future policy
in 1999 was, in some sense, a straightforward and logical extension of the
earlier transparency about the contemporaneous policy setting that was
initiated in July 1995. Essentially, because the FOMC had been voting on
both the current policy setting and a future policy inclination, it seemed
natural to communicate both pieces of information to the public. At the
FOMC meeting on July 1, 1998 (based on now-public transcripts), Don-
ald L. Kohn, who was then a Fed research director, noted that an impor-
tant rationale for releasing the directive stemmed “from a desire at times to
warn markets that a change might be forthcoming in order to reduce the
odds on an overreaction because of the surprise when policy tightening or
easing actually occurred.” Any such ability to shape market expectations
of future policy by using the policy statement would seem to be quite at-
tractive.
After the fact, however, the Fed policymakers were not pleased with the
market reactions to the policy statements in 1999, and there was anguished
discussion in FOMC meetings that year about the apparent confused re-
actions in ﬁnancial markets to the release of the forward-looking language.
At the start of 2000, given the FOMC’s unhappiness with market re-
sponses, the direct signals of policy inclinations were replaced by implicit
ones, speciﬁcally statements about the “balance of risks” to achieving the
Fed’s economic objectives. The formulaic balance of risks language in the
policy statement went as follows, with only one of the three sets of alterna-
tive bracketed words to be used depending on the circumstances: “Against
the background of its long-run goals of price stability and sustainable eco-
nomic growth and of the information currently available, the Committee
believes that the risks are [balanced with respect to prospects for both
goals][weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate heightened
inﬂation pressures][weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate
economic weakness] in the foreseeable future” (Federal Reserve Board
2000, 2). Of course, the three alternative balance of risks options could be
roughly mapped into the three earlier policy bias options of higher, un-
changed, or lower future rates; however, the looser linkage obtained by
avoiding any references to future policy actions appeared important. 
Fed Governor Laurence H. Meyer described the motivation for the bal-
ance of risks language at the December 21, 1999, FOMC meeting: “The
majority [in the FOMC] also wants to change the language to focus on the
252 Glenn D. Rudebusch and John C. WilliamsTable 6.1 Forward-looking language in policy statements issued after FOMC
meetings (all FOMC meetings from May 1999 to June 2006)
Date of Funds Forward-looking language 
meeting rate in FOMC policy statement
05/18/1999 4.75 “...the Committee was concerned about the potential for a 
buildup of inﬂationary imbalances that could undermine the
favorable performance of the economy and therefore adopted a
directive that is tilted toward the possibility of a ﬁrming in the
stance of monetary policy.”
06/30/1999 5.00 “...the FOMC has chosen to adopt a directive that includes no 
predilection about near-term policy action.”
08/24/1999 5.25 “...the directive the Federal Open Market Committee adopted is 
symmetrical with regard to the outlook for policy over the near
term.”
10/05/1999 5.25 “...the Committee adopted a directive that was biased toward 
a possible ﬁrming of policy going forward. Committee members
emphasized that such a directive did not signify a commitment to
near-term action.”
11/16/1999 5.50 “...the directive the Federal Open Market Committee adopted is 
symmetrical with regard to the outlook for policy over the near
term.”
12/21/1999 5.50 “...the Committee decided to adopt a symmetric directive in 
order to indicate that the focus of policy in the intermeeting
period must be ensuring a smooth transition into the Year 2000.”
02/02/2000 5.75 “...the Committee believes the risks are weighted mainly toward
conditions that may generate heightened inﬂation pressures in
the foreseeable future.”
03/21/2000 6.00 Same as 02/02/2000.
05/16/2000 6.50 Same as 02/02/2000.
06/28/2000 6.50 Same as 02/02/2000.
08/22/2000 6.50 Same as 02/02/2000.
10/03/2000 6.50 Same as 02/02/2000.
11/15/2000 6.50 Same as 02/02/2000.
12/19/2000 6.50 “...the Committee consequently believes the risks are weighted 
mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness
in the foreseeable future.”
01/03/2001 6.50 Same as 12/19/2000.
01/31/2001 5.50 Same as 12/19/2000.
03/20/2001 5.00 Same as 12/19/2000.
04/18/2001 4.50 Same as 12/19/2000.
05/15/2001 4.00 Same as 12/19/2000.
06/27/2001 3.75 Same as 12/19/2000.
08/21/2001 3.50 Same as 12/19/2000.
09/17/2001 3.00 Same as 12/19/2000.
10/02/2001 2.50 Same as 12/19/2000.
11/06/2001 2.00 Same as 12/19/2000.
12/11/2001 1.75 Same as 12/19/2000.
01/30/2002 1.75 Same as 12/19/2000.
03/19/2002 1.75 “...the Committee believes that, for the foreseeable future, ...the
risks are balanced with respect to the prospects for both goals.”
05/07/2002 1.75 Same as 03/19/2002.
(continued)06/26/2002 1.75 Same as 03/19/2002.
08/13/2002 1.75 “...the Committee believes that, for the foreseeable future,...the 
risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate
economic weakness.”
09/24/2002 1.75 Same as 08/13/2002.
11/06/2002 1.25 “...the Committee believes that...the risks are balanced with 
respect to the prospects for both goals for the foreseeable future.”
12/10/2002 1.25 Same as 11/06/2002.
01/29/2003 1.25 Same as 11/06/2002.
03/18/2003 1.25 “In light of the unusually large uncertainties clouding the 
geopolitical situation...the Committee does not believe it can
usefully characterize the current balance of risks... ”
05/06/2003 1.25 “...the Committee perceives that over the next few quarters the 
upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable
growth are roughly equal. In contrast, over the same period, the
probability of an unwelcome substantial fall in inﬂation, though
minor, exceeds that of a pickup in inﬂation from its already low
level. The Committee believes that, taken together, the balance of
risks to achieving its goals is weighted toward weakness over the
foreseeable future.”
06/25/2003 1.00 Similar to 05/06/2003.
08/12/2003 1.00 “...the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be 
maintained for a considerable period.”
09/16/2003 1.00 Same as 08/12/2003.
10/28/2003 1.00 Same as 08/12/2003.
12/09/2003 1.00 Same as 08/12/2003.
01/28/2004 1.00 “With inﬂation quite low and resource use slack, the Committee 
believes that it can be patient in removing its policy
accommodation.”
03/16/2004 1.00 Same as 01/28/2004.
05/04/2004 1.00 “...the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be 
removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.”
06/30/2004 1.25 Same as 05/04/2004.
08/10/2004 1.50 Same as 05/04/2004.
09/21/2004 1.75 Same as 05/04/2004.
11/10/2004 2.00 Same as 05/04/2004.
12/14/2004 2.25 Same as 05/04/2004.
02/02/2005 2.50 Same as 05/04/2004.
03/22/2005 2.75 Same as 05/04/2004.
05/03/2005 3.00 Same as 05/04/2004.
06/30/2005 3.25 Same as 05/04/2004.
08/09/2005 3.50 Same as 05/04/2004.
09/20/2005 3.75 Same as 05/04/2004.
11/01/2005 4.00 Same as 05/04/2004.
12/13/2005 4.25 “The Committee judges that some further policy ﬁrming is 
likely to be needed to keep the risks to the attainment of both
sustainable economic growth and price stability roughly in
balance.”
Table 6.1 (continued)
Date of Funds Forward-looking language 
meeting rate in FOMC policy statementbalance of risks in the forecast in order to detach it from an explicit refer-
ence to policy.” Indeed, at that meeting, there was a general agreement
among the participants at the FOMC meeting to reestablish the taboo
against any direct forward-looking signals about policy.
In the event, the implicit balance of risks language was also an imperfect
and short-lived alternative. Its tight formulaic corset of a choice between
“heightened inﬂation pressures” and “economic weakness” was not able to
capture the Committee’s worries in 2003 about a disinﬂationary economic
slowdown and the possibility of inﬂation falling too low. Instead, the
FOMC again decided that a direct statement about its future policy incli-
nations could be a useful means to guide market expectations. Therefore,
as shown in table 6.1, in August 2003, the FOMC introduced the following
language into its public statement: “the Committee believes that policy ac-
commodation can be maintained for a considerable period” (Federal Re-
serve Board 2003). This was a direct, though not unambiguous, indication
that the FOMC anticipated that the policy interest rate could be kept low
for some time. The balance of risks language also remained in the state-
ment in various forms, but it was essentially trumped by the direct forward-
looking language. This initial direct signal was followed by “the Commit-
tee believes that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation”
in January 2004, and by “policy accommodation can be removed at a pace
that is likely to be measured” in May 2004, and by “some further policy
ﬁrming is likely to be needed” in December 2005, and by “further policy
ﬁrming may be needed” in January 2006. Kohn (2005), as a member of the
FOMC, described the underlying reasoning behind this return to an ex-
plicit signal of future policy:
The unusual situation at that time [in 2003] shifted our assessment of the
balance of costs and beneﬁts in favor of a public statement about our ex-
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01/31/2006 4.50 “The Committee judges that some further policy ﬁrming may be 
needed to keep the risks to the attainment of both sustainable
economic growth and price stability roughly in balance.”
03/28/2006 4.75 Same as 01/31/2006.
05/10/2006 5.00 “The Committee judges that some further policy ﬁrming may 
yet be needed to address inﬂation risks... ”
06/29/2006 5.25 “...the Committee judges that some inﬂation risks remain.”
Notes: The date of each FOMC meeting or conference call (or the second day of a two-day
meeting) is given along with the intended target level of the federal funds rate prevailing after
the meeting and the salient forward-looking language in the postmeeting statement about the
future policy inclination or the balance of economic risks.
Table 6.1 (continued)
Date of Funds Forward-looking language 
meeting rate in FOMC policy statementpectations for the near-term path of policy. Markets appeared to be an-
ticipating that inﬂation would pick up soon after the expansion gained
traction, and therefore that interest rates would rise fairly steeply. This
expectation was contrary to our own outlook. We saw economic slack
and rapid productivity growth keeping inﬂation down for some time.
Our expectations about policy also took account of the fact that the level
of inﬂation was already low—lower than it had been for several decades.
We thought that our reaction to a strengthening economy would be
somewhat diﬀerent this time than it had been in many past economic
expansions and unlike what the markets seemed to anticipate.
Furthermore, unlike in 1999, the direct verbal policy signaling begun by
the Fed in 2003 was viewed by many to have been useful in guiding ﬁnan-
cial markets (as discussed in the following). However, as noted in the in-
troduction, its continued future use remains open to debate. Indeed, direct
interest rate guidance was removed from the policy statement released af-
ter the FOMC meeting on June 29, 2006—the last entry in table 6.1. At that
meeting, the Fed returned to an indirect indication of future policy incli-
nations by noting that “some inﬂation risks remain.”
A few other central banks have also provided direct verbal signals about
their future policy inclinations.9 For example, in 1999, the Bank of Japan
lowered its policy interest rate to zero and announced its intention to main-
tain the zero rate “until deﬂationary concerns are dispelled.” This verbal
signal to the public that the Bank of Japan would maintain a zero policy
rate into the future—conditional on continued price deﬂation—was a key
element of what was known as the “zero interest rate policy” and later as
“quantitative easing.” This signal, which tried to persuade ﬁnancial mar-
ket participants to lower their expectations of future short rates and,
hence, lower long rates, was part of an attempt to stimulate the economy
and escape from deﬂation. Just as in the United States, however, the con-
tinued future use of such direct signals appears in doubt. (See Bernanke,
Reinhart, and Sack 2004; Oda and Ueda 2005.)
In contrast to the signals given in the United States and Japan, which
were verbal and appeared to be transitory responses to special circum-
stances, two central banks—the RBNZ and the Norges Bank—have been
providing quantitative and ongoing guidance on the future policy rate
path.10 Indeed, the RBNZ has provided numerical policy interest rate pro-
jections that reﬂect the policymaker’s views to the public since 1997
(Archer 2005). For example, ﬁgure 6.1, which is from the March 2006
RBNZ Monetary Policy Statement, contrasts the RBNZ’s expected path
for future policy over the next two years with the path expected by ﬁnan-
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9. In 2006, the Bank of Canada telegraphed its intentions in policy statements that noted
“some modest further increase in the policy interest rate may be required to keep aggregate
supply and demand in balance and inﬂation on target over the medium term.”
10. The Central Bank of Colombia also published quantitative interest rate forecasts in four
inﬂation reports from December 2003 to September 2004.cial markets.11 In this Statement, the Governor of the RBNZ describes the
expected policy path as follows:
As long as these inﬂation risks remain under control, we do not expect
to raise interest rates again in this cycle. However given the time that it
will take to bring inﬂation back towards the mid-point of the [inﬂation]
target band, we do not expect to be in a position to ease policy this year.
Any earlier easing would require a more rapid reduction in domestic in-
ﬂation pressures than the substantial slowing already assumed in our
projections. (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2006, 2)
All in all, the RBNZ Monetary Policy Statement provides a remarkably
clear judgment on the most likely future path of policy.
While the RBNZ has been a pioneer in the publication of quantitative
projections of the policy interest rate (and other economic variables), the
Norges Bank has recently gone even further, as described in Qvigstad
(2005) and Svensson (2006b). Since 2005, the Norges Bank has been pro-
viding not only the numerical expected future path of the policy interest
rate, but also conﬁdence intervals around this projection and state-
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11. The policy rate of the RBNZ is actually an overnight Oﬃcial Cash Rate, but that is
closely linked to the ninety-day interest rate, which is displayed.
Fig. 6.1 RBNZ projection of short-term interest rate
Note: The solid line shows the historical data and the RBNZ’s March 2006 baseline projec-
tion for the ninety-day interest rate (which is closely linked to the oﬃcial policy interest rate).
The dashed line shows expected rates in ﬁnancial markets.
Source: RBNZ March 2006 Monetary Policy Statement, ﬁgure 2.6.contingent alternative scenarios. As shown in ﬁgure 6.2, which is from the
November 2005 Norges Bank Inﬂation Report(Norges Bank 2005, 12), the
baseline policy interest rate path rises steadily over the next three years. As
described in the report, the projections “indicate that the interest rate will
increase by about 1 percentage point in the course of next year, which is in
line with expectations in the money and foreign exchange market. At the
two to three year horizon, we expect a further, gradual rise in the interest
rate. Our interest rate projections further out are somewhat higher than
forward rates in the ﬁnancial market” (Norges Bank 2005, 5). The Norges
Bank also provides a probability distribution or fan chart around its base-
line interest rate projection, as denoted by the shaded regions in ﬁgure 6.2.
By outlining the range of possible monetary policy responses to unex-
pected macroeconomic disturbances, these conﬁdence intervals highlight
the conditional nature of the baseline projection. The conditionality of the
interest rate projection is further reinforced by two speciﬁc alternative sce-
narios that are displayed in ﬁgure 6.2 and described in the Inﬂation Report.
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Fig. 6.2 Norges Bank projection of its policy interest rate
Note: The dark central line is the recent past and the Norges Bank’s November 2005 baseline
projection of the policy interest rate (“sight deposit rate”) over the next three years. The sur-
rounding bands represent 30, 50, 70, and 90 percent conﬁdence intervals around the baseline
projection. Projected policy rate paths under two separate alternate scenarios are also shown.
Source: Norges Bank November 2005 Inﬂation Report, chart 1.9a.In one alternative, labeled “Stronger trade shifts,” the greater pass-through
of low import prices lowers inﬂation and the policy rate, while in the other,
labeled “Higher inﬂation,” a shock boosts inﬂation and the policy rate.
6.2.2 Assessments of Direct Signaling of Policy Inclinations
The preceding descriptions of various instances of direct policy rate sig-
naling convey some of the variety of the recent historical experience. The
range of practice—from complete silence to explicit quarter-by-quarter
numerical guidance—is breathtakingly wide. Such signaling has elicited
strong reactions, both pro and con, from central bankers and academic re-
searchers. We will consider two common practical objections to direct sig-
nals and then survey some of the research on the eﬀects of transparency.
The ﬁrst objection is an institutional one. Many have argued that
forward-looking policy signals are very diﬃcult, if not impossible, for mon-
etary policymakers to produce; that is, a committee of monetary policy-
makers may be unable to agree on a likely future path. This is the view of
Goodhart (2001, 172–73), a former member of the Monetary Policy Com-
mittee (MPC) of the Bank of England, who notes:
It is hard to see how a committee could ever reach a majority for any par-
ticular time path. A great advantage of restricting the choice to what to
do now, this month, is that it makes the decision relatively simple, even
stark. Given the diﬃculties involved already in achieving majority agree-
ment in the MPC on this simple decision, the idea of trying to choose a
complete time path by discretionary choice seems entirely fanciful and
counterproductive.
Blinder (2004) and Mishkin (2004) essentially concur with Goodhart’s
pessimistic assessment. Of course, as Blinder (1998) earlier bemoaned, it
seems quite unsatisfactory to ignore the fact that optimal policy in an econ-
omy with forward-looking agents will require at least an implicit time pro-
ﬁle for future policy. Indeed, Svensson (2005b) has argued that conveying
an understanding of the likely future path of the policy rate is crucial, and
he suggests obtaining consensus on a quantitative path with a fairly
straightforward voting mechanism. In this respect, the successful practical
example of the Norges Bank, in which a seven-person executive board has
been able to agree on and publish a quantitative future policy path, should
alleviate some concerns about the impracticality of obtaining agreement
on future policy rate signals.12In the following, in our formal modeling, we
do not address the institutional dynamics of policy committees but simply
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12. Alternatively, the diversity of opinion about the future on a policy committee could be
informative, and Archer (2005) suggested publishing the “braid” of separate interest rate
paths of individual committee members. As noted by Archer (2005), the New Zealand expe-
rience is not informative on this issue, as the RBNZ has a single monetary policymaker.assume that the monetary authority can formulate a likely future path for
the policy rate.
A second objection to direct signaling is that ﬁnancial market partici-
pants will inevitably misinterpret the central bank’s signals.13Policymakers
often express the fear that ﬁnancial markets will misconstrue statements of
policy inclinations and, in particular, that the markets will interpret them
as essentially guarantees of future policy action.14 At the FOMC meeting
on July 1, 1998, Kohn noted that a forward-looking policy announcement
“could lock in market expectations and reduce ﬂexibility because it would
set up situations in which the market expected some action and the Com-
mittee would then have to worry about disappointing those expectations.”
In the event, of course, as noted in the preceding, such misunderstandings
did occur. As described in The Wall Street Journal (Schlesinger 2000, A2):
When the Fed started revealing its “bias” statements in May, ﬁnancial
markets tended to treat the directives as a virtual guarantee of the out-
come of subsequent meetings—assuming a “bias” toward tightening
likely meant a rate rise, and that a neutral bias likely meant no rate rise.
That wasn’t what the Fed intended. With markets ascribing greater clar-
ity to Fed statements than the Fed did, oﬃcials at times felt boxed in by
extreme market reactions.
A similar view of the confusion resulting from the direct signals was ex-
pressed in the oﬃcial postmortem assessment of the 1999 policy state-
ments, titled “Modiﬁcations to the FOMC’s Disclosure Procedures” (re-
leased on January 19, 2000), which noted that the direct forward-looking
policy language
caused some unanticipated confusion. It became apparent that the
public was uncertain about the interpretation of the language used to
characterize possible future developments, about the time period to
which it applied, and about the extent to which the announced changes
in that language represented major shifts in the Committee’s assessment.
Perhaps partly as a result, the announcement of a directive biased to-
ward tightening seemed to exaggerate the responses of ﬁnancial markets
to subsequent information bearing on the likely course of interest rates
and monetary policy. (Federal Reserve Board 2000, 1)
Of course, part of the confusion in 1999 stemmed from the particular
language that was used in the statement. In contrast, the direct verbal pol-
icy signals provided by the Fed in 2003 and thereafter have been generally
viewed as successful. Kohn (2005), Bernanke (2004), and Woodford (2005),
for example, all argue that the language was properly interpreted and that
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13. A related objection is that the presence of forward-looking policy signals may change
the behavior of ﬁnancial market participants so that ﬁnancial markets provide a less useful
summary of private information for central banks.
14. The Governor of the Bank of England (King 2006) recently noted that “trying to give di-
rect hints on the path of interest rates over the next few months risks deceiving ﬁnancial mar-
kets into believing there are deﬁnite plans for the next few months when no such plans exist.”market rates were inﬂuenced in the right direction. This interpretation has
garnered some support from empirical studies as well. Overall, for example,
the incremental steps toward greater openness and transparency that the
Fed took throughout the 1990s and early 2000s appear to have had impor-
tant eﬀects on ﬁnancial markets. Indeed, as documented by Lange, Sack,
and Whitesell (2003) and Swanson (2006), ﬁnancial markets became much
better at forecasting the future path of monetary policy than they were in
the 1980s and early 1990s and more certain of their forecast ex ante, as mea-
sured by implied volatilities from options.15 Other studies that have been
more narrowly focused on the speciﬁc eﬀects of recent forward-looking 
Fed policy statements, notably Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) and
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a), have supported the notion that
these statements have been useful in suggesting to the public a particular
course of future action, although as described in Rudebusch (2006), any im-
provement has been at a horizon of only a couple of months. The experience
of the RBNZ, which has given speciﬁc numerical policy guidance for over a
decade, is generally positive. As discussed by Archer (2005), ﬁnancial mar-
kets in New Zealand have reacted favorably to the central bank’s interest
rate forecasts and understood their conditionality. Although the Norges
Bank has only a very brief track record of interest rate projections, the ex-
plicit conﬁdence bands provided should reinforce forecast conditionality,
and so far, its experience has been favorable.
Of course, the counterfactuals in these cases cannot be observed, so it is
diﬃcult to assess deﬁnitely the eﬀectiveness of the recent direct interest rate
communication. Indeed, some have judged the recent U.S. episode far less
favorably. As noted in Business Week Online (Miller 2005):
But what started out as a well-meaning attempt to give investors a clear
sense of where monetary policy was headed has degenerated into a
muddled message that has sown confusion in ﬁnancial markets and
helped fan fears of higher inﬂation among investors. That has raised
questions inside and outside the Fed about whether the central bank’s
extraordinary strategy of mollycoddling the markets has done more
harm than good.
And the president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Jean-Claude
Trichet (2006), made it clear that the ECB would not be sending similar di-
rect signals about the likely path of its policy interest rate.16
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15. Of course, this greater certainty about future rates may be precisely the worry of those
opposing direct guidance on interest rates, namely, that providing information about the ﬁrst
moment of future interest rates—the expected path—will distort the second moment of fu-
ture rates, reducing the implied volatility or dispersion of expected future rates in an unwar-
ranted fashion.
16. Trichet (2006) noted that
The ECB does not embark on a particular multi-monthly pre-commitment on interest rates
or on the path of future policy interest rates. As the Governing Council has decided to
regularly consider the most up-to-date information, such an unconditional commitmentEven among those who judged the Fed’s direct signaling to have been
useful, many considered it a one-time solution for a transitory deﬂationary
risk. Notably, the signaling could be considered a particular example of the
strategy of stimulating the economy discussed by Reifschneider and
Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), which provides as-
surances when the current policy rate is close to or at its lower bound that
future rates will also be kept low. Indeed, as noted in the preceding, it ap-
pears unlikely that the Fed will employ an ongoing strategy of direct sig-
naling. For example, in the United States, the minutes of the FOMC meet-
ing of November 10, 2004, stated, “A few members felt that, because of
greater uncertainties, it might become appropriate eventually to move
away from the recent practice of providing guidance about the likely future
path of policy, while others emphasized the desirability of continuing to be
as informative as possible about the Committee’s perceived outlook.” And,
as noted in the preceding, direct signals were discontinued in the June 2006
policy statement.17
For some, given the sophistication of the ﬁnancial system, it is perhaps
easy to dismiss at an abstract level concerns about the inevitable break-
down of communication between central banks and markets. However,
there is still much unknown about the precise relationship between the rev-
elation of information and market pricing, and this black box has long
worried central bankers (Goodfriend 1986). Perhaps the most subtle ren-
dering by a policymaker of the diﬃculties inherent in communicating with
ﬁnancial markets is provided by Kohn (2005):
In fact, economists do not fully understand how markets incorporate in-
formation. Herding behavior, information cascades, multiple equilibria,
and the amount of investment in ﬁnancial research all pose puzzles
about markets and information. The situation is complicated still more
when an important participant is seen as having superior information
owing to its investment in research or its understanding of its own be-
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would limit the ability of the Governing Council to react to changes in the economic situ-
ation and therefore hamper our credibility and our capacity to preserve the solid anchor-
ing of inﬂation expectations. This is, in particular, the reason why we refused to promise to
maintain interest rates at 2 percent for a “considerable period of time.”
17. Poole (2005b) appears to express the view of at least a few FOMC members when he
notes that
most of the time the FOMC cannot provide accurate information to the market as to the
probable course of the target fed funds rate, in terms of a speciﬁc path measured in basis
points. The future path will be conditional on future information that cannot itself be pre-
dicted. Attempts to provide speciﬁc forward-looking guidance will prove inaccurate and
even misleading to the market. Moreover, the Fed could create a credibility problem for it-
self if forward guidance is too speciﬁc. If the market acts on the guidance, and the Fed sub-
sequently responds to new information in a way that departs from the guidance, then the
market will naturally feel that it has been misled. But if the Fed fails to respond to new in-
formation that seems to demand a response, in the interest of doing what it said it was go-
ing to do, then failure to respond may also damage credibility.havior. In such circumstances, certain types of central bank talk might
actually impinge on welfare-enhancing market pricing by being misun-
derstood and receiving too much weight relative to private judgments.
Some of the research underlying this apprehension about transparency is
by Morris and Shin (2002), who provided a simple theoretical model in
which the public revelation of policy information can be bad for social wel-
fare. This work has been widely cited and followed by a vigorous debate in-
troducing new theoretical modiﬁcations. For example, Svensson (2006a)
argues that the Morris and Shin result has been widely misinterpreted and
that their antitransparency result is only obtained for a small set of unlikely
parameter values, while various authors, including Roca (2005) and Hell-
wig (2005), show that transparency can increase welfare in more general
models. Indeed, as is apparent in surveys by Geraats (2002), Carpenter
(2004), and Woodford (2005), many conclusions about the value of trans-
parency appear to hinge on the exact speciﬁcation of the theoretical mod-
els. However, with just a few exceptions, the literature has not actually ex-
amined the eﬀects of the release of forward-looking policy information for
macroeconomic dynamics and stabilization. It is this line of reasoning that
we pursue in the next two sections.
6.3 A Framework for Analyzing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections
In this section and the next, we analyze how publishing central bank in-
terest rate projections can aﬀect private expectations and macroeconomic
performance in a simple model of the economy. In this section, we describe
our framework, which is a standard New Keynesian structure modiﬁed to
allow for asymmetric information sets for private agents and the central
bank. In particular, in our model, as described in detail in the next section,
the central bank may have an informational advantage over the public that
reﬂects its better information regarding its policy intentions. At the outset,
note that we abstract from two issues that have been widely discussed in the
past literature on central bank transparency. First, we assume that the cen-
tral bank is able to commit to future policy actions and therefore does not
face a Barro-Gordon time inconsistency problem. Second, we assume that
the central bank’s provision of information does not aﬀect a private agent’s
collection or use of idiosyncratic information; thus, we ignore the strategic
complementarity highlighted in Morris and Shin (2002).
6.3.1 A Model of Interest Rates, Output, and Inﬂation
For our analysis, we use a standard log-linearized New Keynesian model
(see Woodford [2003] for further discussion). The output gap, yt, is deter-
mined by a forward-looking “IS curve” given by the intertemporal saving
decision:
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∗)   Etyt 1,
where it is the nominal interest rate,  t is the inﬂation rate, rt
∗ is the natural
rate of interest (which is assumed to follow a known stationary process),
and Et denotes mathematical expectations conditional on the available
time t information set. (Throughout our analysis, we abstract from inter-
cepts.) We have implicitly assumed log preferences so that the coeﬃcient
on the interest rate is unity. Solving this equation forward T– 1 periods, we
can express the output gap in terms of the expected short-term real inter-
est rate gaps over the next T periods and the output gap T periods in the
future:
(2) yt    Et∑
T 1
j 0
(it j    t j 1   r
∗
t j)   Etyt T.
This version of the IS curve illustrates a basic insight of modern macro-
economic theory: monetary policy aﬀects output through the expected
future path of real interest rates. Generalizations of this model that incor-
porate a richer description of consumption, investment, and other compo-
nents of output leave this basic insight intact (see Woodford [2003] and
Fuhrer and Rudebusch [2004] for discussion).
It is useful to reformulate this condition in terms of bond yields. Denote
the ex ante real T-period bond rate by RT,t, which, abstracting from a term
premium, equals the expected average real interest rate over the next T
periods:
(3) RT,t    Et ∑
T 1
j 0
(it j    t 1 j).
Let R
∗










Given these deﬁnitions, the IS curve can be represented by the following
simple equation relating the output gap to the real bond rate gap, which is
the diﬀerence between the real bond rate and the corresponding natural
rate, plus the output gap expected T periods in the future (which, for suﬃ-
ciently large values of T is approximately zero):
(5) yt    T(RT,t   R
∗
T,t)   Etyt T.
This formulation makes evident the central role of long-term real interest
rates for the conduct of monetary policy (see McGough, Rudebusch, and
Williams 2005).
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where ut is a distortionary stationary shock to marginal cost,   is the rate
of time preference, and κmeasures the sensitivity of inﬂation to the output
gap. Solving this equation forward yields the following equation for inﬂa-
tion in terms of expected real bond rates:
(7)  t    κEt∑
 
j 0
 j(RT,t j   R
∗
T,t j   yt T   ut j).
As in the case of the output gap equation, this reformulation of the Phillips
curve highlights the central role of expected real bond rate gaps in deter-
mining current inﬂation. It is clear from this representation that private
agents, and by implication monetary policymakers who strive to ensure
macroeconomic stabilization, are interested in the whole future path of the
short-term policy interest rate.
For our following analysis, we assume κ   0.15 and   1. The value of
κ is consistent with Calvo price setting with one-quarter of all prices reop-
timized each quarter, log utility from consumption, and a 0.8 elasticity of
disutility from work.18 We assume that the variance of the markup shocks
equals unity; shocks to the natural rate of interest play no part in our anal-
ysis in the following. Our results are not qualitatively sensitive to these pa-
rameter assumptions.
6.3.2 Monetary Policy
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the central bank’s objec-
tive is to minimize the weighted sum of the unconditional variance of the
inﬂation gap, which is the diﬀerence between the inﬂation rate and a time-
varying target inﬂation rate,  t
∗, and the unconditional variance of the out-
put gap. Speciﬁcally, the central bank loss,  , is given by:
(8)     VAR ( t    t
∗)    VAR (yt),
where VAR(x) denotes the unconditional variance of a variable x and   is
the relative weight on output gap variability.
We allow for modest variation over time in the medium-term inﬂation
rate that the central bank attempts to achieve. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
the inﬂation target is a mean zero autoregressive process, subject to sto-
chastic shocks:
(9)  t
∗     
∗
t 1   υt,   ∈ (0, 1), υt ~ N(0,  2
υ),
where the inﬂation target innovation, υt, is assumed to be an independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normally distributed random variable.
Note that the unconditional, or long-run, inﬂation target is assumed to be
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18. We assume   1, so monetary policies can be easily evaluated in terms of uncondi-
tional variances.constant. We assume that  t
∗ is persistent, with   0.9, but that its condi-
tional variance is quite small, with  2
υ   0.01. Persistent target shocks can
be justiﬁed by time variation in the factors that inﬂuence the optimal choice
of the inﬂation rate, including distortions to the economy, bias in inﬂation
measures, and structural changes that aﬀect the magnitude of the problems
associated with the zero lower bound on interest rates. In addition, the op-
timal strategy in the vicinity of the lower bound is to implicitly target a
higher rate of inﬂation than usual for a number of years, as discussed in
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
providing justiﬁcation for time variation in the medium-run inﬂation ob-
jective.19 Note that the assumed implied unconditional standard deviation
of the inﬂation target is only about 0.2 percentage point, which is plausibly
modest. Indeed, much related recent macro-ﬁnance research ﬁnds that the
inﬂation target embedded in bond yields does move signiﬁcantly and per-
sistently over time (e.g., Kozicki and Tinsley 2001; Rudebusch and Wu
2004, 2007; Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2005b; and Hördahl, Tristani,
and Vestin 2006).20 In any case, the resulting unconditional variation ﬁts
well inside the explicit inﬂation target ranges announced by many central
banks, which are typically a percentage point in width.
As discussed in Woodford (2003), in this model optimal monetary pol-
icy under commitment with complete information is implicitly described
by the condition:
 t    t
∗   (yt   yt 1).
In the following, we append a transitory policy shock, wt, to this optimal-
ity condition so that monetary policy is set according to:
(10)  t    t
∗   wt   (yt   yt 1),
where wt is assumed to be an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable
with variance  2
w   1. Throughout the following, we assume that policy is
set according to this equation and is not recalibrated depending on the in-
formation assumptions that we make. We view the policy shocks as repre-
senting the central bank’s response to transitory factors outside the model.
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19. For example, one could interpret the recent heightened concerns about the possibility
of deﬂationary stagnation in the United States as an episode of implicitly targeting a some-
what higher rate of inﬂation than usual for a few years owing to concerns about the zero lower
bound on interest rates.
20. More generally, in the United States, and in many other countries, there is considerable
empirical evidence that persistent shocks to the inﬂation target have occurred, as exempliﬁed
by the disinﬂations of the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s, which suggest a gradual
ratcheting down of the inﬂation target over time. See, for example, Bomﬁm and Rudebusch
(2000), Erceg and Levin (2003), and Cogley and Sbordone (2005).tice involves a vast amount of subtle knowledge and judgment. In part,
such information may reﬂect policymakers’ assessments about asymmetric
risks to the outlook that are not directly connected to the mean forecast for
inﬂation and output. For example, these asymmetric risks may reﬂect fears
about fallout from ﬁnancial instability, and the Fed has responded a num-
ber of times to threats to the ﬁnancial system: in 1987, following the stock
market crash, in 1998, when international ﬁnancial markets threatened to
freeze up, and in 2001, following the terrorist attacks on September 11. Fi-
nally, it should be stressed that in real time the policymaker may not have
a clear read on the data and does not know the best way to minimize the
loss function.
Although the policy equation is written in an implicit form in terms of
the inﬂation gap and the change in output, it can be equivalently repre-
sented by an explicit interest rate reaction function where the policy in-
strument, the short-term interest rate, is determined by variables in the sys-
tem. In such a formulation, the time-varying inﬂation target,  t
∗, and the
policy shock, wt, represent deviations by the central bank from its policy
reaction function, similar to the residuals of an estimated monetary policy
rule (as in Svensson 2003; Rudebusch 2002, 2006).
6.4 The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Publishing Interest Rate Projections
In this section, we use the theoretical framework outlined in the preced-
ing to analyze how publishing central bank interest rate projections aﬀects
macroeconomic behavior and the central bank calculation of loss. A crucial
aspect of our analysis is the structure of information: what the public knows
and doesn’t know. Because the focus of this chapter is on the eﬀects of pub-
lishing interest rate projections, in the following we focus on the eﬀects of
incomplete knowledge on the part of the public regarding the future path of
policy that is ultimately due to uncertainty about the future actions of the
central bank. We abstract from information asymmetries regarding the
state of the economy, a topic analyzed in a recent paper by Walsh (2005). In
particular, we assume that the public and the central bank have identical
and complete information about the parameters describing the model econ-
omy and both observe the current shocks to the natural rate of interest and
the shock to marginal costs, rt
∗ and ut, respectively.21 That is, the public and
the central bank are both assumed to know the structure and parameters of
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21. This assumption seems appropriate for analyzing inﬂation targeting central banks, the
majority of which provide detailed information regarding their views on the economic out-
look, conditional on some stipulated path of policy (e.g., constant nominal rate or market ex-
pectations). For non-inﬂation-targeting central banks, communication of interest rate pro-
jections likely conveys useful information both about the central bank’s views on the economy
and about the policy response to the outlook. See Geraats (2005) for a discussion and refer-
ences to the literature on the eﬀects of transparency when the central bank has asymmetric
information regarding the economic outlook.the equations describing output, inﬂation, and the inﬂation target, and the
functional form of the equation describing monetary policy.
We consider two illustrative examples where the public is imperfectly in-
formed regarding future policy actions and is uncertain how the central
bank will respond in the future to economic conditions. First, we analyze
the case, which we refer to as “policy rule uncertainty,” in which the public
does not know the parameters of the policy rule. In this case, private agents
must estimate a policy rule using information from both past central bank
actions and information contained in published interest rate projections.
The publication of central bank interest rate projections may facilitate the
public’s understanding of the policy rule and so improve their predictions
of the future course of the economy. In the second case, we examine an
economy where the public has imperfect knowledge of the central bank’s
medium-run inﬂation target,  t
∗, which we refer to as “inﬂation target un-
certainty.” The public is assumed to infer the medium-run inﬂation target
from information contained in past policy actions and from central bank
interest rate projections. The publication of interest rate projections may
improve the public’s estimate of the medium-run inﬂation target and
thereby improve the public’s ability to forecast future policy actions and in-
ﬂation.
6.4.1 Policy Rule Uncertainty
We ﬁrst analyze an economy where the public knows the central bank’s
inﬂation target but is uncertain about the parameterization of the central
bank’s policy rule. In this case, the public forms its expectations about fu-
ture policy and the economy using an estimated policy rule.22The assump-
tion that the public is uncertain about the central bank’s reaction functions
seems realistic in light of the ongoing debate about the speciﬁcation and
parameters of the FOMC’s reaction function. More generally, given the
limited available data from consistent policy regimes, uncertainty about
central bank reaction functions appears to be a pervasive feature of the
economic landscape.
One could imagine a central bank publishing its policy rule and elimi-
nating this type of uncertainty. Indeed, Svensson (2005b) has argued that
the central bank should publish its objective function and model and
thereby provide the public with all the information it needs to form expec-
tations of future policy actions. However, we view a central bank’s knowl-
edge and understanding of its own preferences, and by implication its pol-
icy strategy, as far too complex and inchoate ever to be explicitly expressed
to the public or, indeed, even written down within the halls of the central
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22. A similar problem was studied by Orphanides and Williams (2005), but they did not
consider the value of interest rate projections in improving the public’s estimates of the policy
rule.bank. Not surprisingly, no central bank has yet put Svensson’s proposal
into practice. Still, based on the experiences discussed earlier in this chap-
ter, we do think that the central bank can provide a potentially useful sig-
nal to the private sector of its plans for the future setting of the policy rate.
In the simpliﬁed model that we are using, there is only a single free pa-
rameter in the policy rule to be estimated: the coeﬃcient in front of the
change in the output gap,  /κ. Assuming (as we do) that the public knows
the value of κ, uncertainty about the parameters of the monetary policy
rule is equivalent to uncertainty about the central bank’s preferences, in
particular, the penalty on output gap variability. We assume that private
agents know the general formulation of the policy rule and know the true
inﬂation target so that their estimation problem is far simpler than that
faced by the public in reality. In this way, our analysis likely understates the
eﬀects of publishing interest rate projections on public expectations and
macroeconomic performance. Nonetheless, the analysis of this simple
problem nicely illustrates the qualitative eﬀects of providing interest rate
projections when the public is uncertain how the central bank will react to
economic conditions.
Of course, in theory, if a policy regime were ﬁxed for all time, agents
would gradually accumulate precise information regarding the policy rule
from observed policy actions and the uncertainty regarding the central
bank’s preferences would vanish. In practice, however, agents must form
expectations having gathered only a ﬁnite set of observations of any given
policy regime. One could explicitly endogenize the choice of the data
sample used in policy rule estimation by allowing for time variation in the
value of  , but that would introduce a nonlinearity into the model and sig-
niﬁcantly complicate the analysis. Instead, for the present purpose, we as-
sume that the policy regime is ﬁxed and simply posit an environment where
agents use only n observations in estimating the monetary policy reaction
function. We consider two illustrative cases: in one, agents use the past
forty observations (ten years of data) in estimating the policy rule; in the
second, agents use eighty observations (twenty years of data).
We assume the central bank can choose to augment the public’s infor-
mation regarding the monetary policy rule through communication of its
future policy intentions. Speciﬁcally, we assume that each period, the cen-
tral bank can provide a signal, denoted iP
t 1|t, of its own internal projection
of the next period’s interest rate setting, denoted Et(it   1|CB), where the
conditioning information set is clearly denoted as the central bank’s. (In
the literature, these are often termed “unconditional” forecasts.)23
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23. Note that in the simple model that we consider, the central bank could provide “un-
conditional” projections of inﬂation or the output gap, meaning projections consistent with
the projected future path of interest rates, and the analysis and results would be the same as
in the case of interest rate projections. This equivalency obtains because all of these projec-
tions are linear combinations of the same state variables. This contrasts with the case of cen-As discussed in section 6.2, central bank communication of interest rate
projections is often verbal and imprecise in practice. Even if the central
bank provides a numerical interest rate projection, the manner in which it
is constructed, say, by taking a median vote, may create a wedge between
the published projection and the true expected path for interest rates.
Therefore, in our analysis, we allow for transmission noise in conveying the
interest rate projection to the public. This noise reﬂects the fact that the
central bank may not be able to, or may not choose to, send a perfectly
clear signal of its expectation of future policy. In particular, we assume that
the central bank signal of its interest rate projection is given by:
(11) iP
t 1|t   Et(it 1|CB)   zt, zt ~ N(0,  z
2),
where the transmission noise, zt, is assumed to be an i.i.d. normally dis-
tributed random variable with variance  z
2. The limiting case of  z  cor-
responds to the central bank providing no useful information to the public
regarding the future course of policy. The opposite limiting case of  z   0
corresponds to the central bank perfectly communicating to the public its
expectation of the interest rate path and thereby its policy rule. For inter-
mediate cases, we interpret a highly noisy signal, say,  z 1, as correspond-
ing to a central bank providing only qualitative hints about the possible
direction of future policy. A modestly noisy signal, say,  z   0.1, suggests
a central bank providing fairly detailed, numerical information about its
expectations of the future path of policy.
Note that for analytical convenience, we assume that all the information
regarding the future course of policy is contained in the central bank’s one-
step-ahead projection of the interest rate. In practice, a central bank is likely
to communicate a forecast that covers several periods. In our model, there
is no additional information contained in the two-step-ahead forecast that
is not already contained in the one-step-ahead forecast. More generally,
though, we view providing a multiperiod forecast as a way to reduce the
transmission noise relative to a one-step-ahead forecast, so it can be ana-
lyzed in this framework as a reduction in the degree of transmission noise.
Given the past history of central bank signals and actions, private agents
estimate the value of   on the basis of the policy equation. In particular, at
the end of each period, agents run two regressions using the most recent n
observations of data. The ﬁrst is a regression of the observed inﬂation gap
on the observed change in the output gap. Because we assume the inﬂation
target is known, no intercept or other term is included in the regression.
Note that the innovation to this equation is the policy shock, wt. Because
this equation involves endogenous variables on both sides, estimation is
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tral bank publication of forecasts of inﬂation and output conditional on an arbitrary assumed
path of policy with no explicit guidance on policy, as is typically done in many central banks.
These conditional forecasts yield no useful information regarding the nature of the shocks to
the public in our model.done using instrumental variables, where the lagged output gap is the in-
strument. The second is a regression of the expected one-period-ahead in-
ﬂation gap on the expected one-period-ahead change in the output gap
consistent with the published central bank interest rate projection. Esti-
mation of this equation is likewise done using instrumental variables. Note
that the innovation in this case is the central bank transmission noise, zt. In
both cases, we impose the restriction that the estimated coeﬃcient be pos-
itive, consistent with the restriction that the penalty on output gap vari-
ability be nonnegative. For symmetry and to avoid an upward bias in the
estimates, we also impose the restriction that the estimated coeﬃcient be
no larger than twice the true value. Given the assumption that   1, the
estimates are constrained to lie between 0 and 2, inclusive.
Estimation of these two equations yields two point estimates of  and es-
timates of the variances of the residuals in the two equations. We assume
that agents then form an estimate   ˆ
tby taking a weighted average of the two
point estimates, with the weights equaling the inverse of the respective
standard deviations of the regression residuals. In this way, agents take into
account the relative amounts of noise observed from the two sources of in-
formation regarding the monetary policy rule.24 In the following period,
agents compute expectations of future variables conditional on   ˆ
t. Then,
given the realized values of the innovations, the values of all endogenous
variables are computed. The process is then continued, with agents reesti-
mating the policy rule equations at the end of each period.25 We compute
the statistics of interest for these experiments using model stochastic sim-
ulations. We run each simulation 41,000 periods and drop the ﬁrst 1,000
periods to minimize the eﬀects of initial conditions.
Central bank publication of interest rate projections improves the
public’s understanding of the central bank’s policy rule. The solid line of
ﬁgure 6.3 shows the root mean squared error (RMSE) of   ˆ
t (relative to the
true value of   1) over the simulations for various degrees of transmis-
sion noise, as measured by  z. As noted in the preceding, the solid line as-
sumes that agents estimate the policy rule using only forty periods of data,
but still the average estimation errors for   ˆ
tare reasonably modest. As seen
in ﬁgure 6.3, clear communication of interest rate projections facilitates the
public’s ability to estimate the policy rule. With zero transmission noise,
the public’s estimate of the policy rule equals the true policy rule at all
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24. This method of combining estimates performs very well in terms of the resulting eﬃ-
ciency of the estimates in the model simulations. An alternative approach of having agents ap-
ply maximum likelihood would likely yield similar results, but at a much greater computa-
tional cost.
25. Technically, each period, we compute the rational expectations equilibrium consistent
with the public’s estimate of  . We then compute residuals to the policy rule equation and to
the equation describing the policy projection that make the setting of policy and the expecta-
tion of policy consistent with the true value of   and the realized values of wt and zt.times. But as the degree of transmission noise rises, the accuracy of the
public’s estimates of the policy rule diminishes.
Publication of interest rate projections is potentially useful at aligning
private and central bank expectations even if the public has a relatively
long history of observations of policy actions. The dashed line in ﬁgure 6.3
shows the RMSE of   ˆ
t, assuming that agents use eighty observations in es-
timating the policy rule.26Not surprisingly, the eﬀect of publishing interest
rate projections (for a given transmission noise) is smaller when the public
has a longer history of policy actions on which to base their policy rule es-
timates. Nevertheless, even with twenty years of data, publication of inter-
est rate projections can have a potentially signiﬁcant eﬀect on the public’s
understanding of the policy rule.
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26. The doubling of the number of observations would, all else equal, lead to a reduction in
the RMSE by a factor of  2  . This is indeed approximately true for the results reported in ﬁg-
ure 6.3 when  z is 1/2 or smaller. However, the restriction that   ˆ
t be between 0 and 2 reduces
its RMSE, and this eﬀect is larger when the sample size is small and when the magnitude of
transmission noise is large. As a result, for values of  z above 1/2, the RMSE curve for n   40
lies below what would be expected based on the diﬀerence in sample sizes.
Fig. 6.3 Interest rate projections and estimates of  This alignment of the public’s and the central bank’s expectations of
monetary policy reduces the magnitude of ﬂuctuations in output and the
inﬂation gap and, therefore, on the central bank loss. The solid line in ﬁg-
ure 6.4 shows the central bank loss for various degrees of central bank
transmission noise,  z, when n   40. For comparison, the loss assuming
that the central bank does not publish interest rate projections is about
1.03. The central bank loss is minimized when the transmission noise is
zero and rises as  zincreases. Even a noisy central bank signal of policy in-
tentions yields a noticeable improvement in macroeconomic performance
over that which would occur absent central bank publication of interest
rate projections.
The beneﬁts of central bank communication of interest rate projections
are greatest when the public has relatively little data on which to base their
estimates of the policy rule. The dashed line in ﬁgure 6.4 shows the corre-
sponding results for n   80. The beneﬁts of communicating policy inten-
tions are only about one-half as large as when n 40. Of course, in the limit
as the sample size increases to inﬁnity, central bank interest rate projec-
tions would be superﬂuous because the public would know the exact policy
rule based on past observations of policy actions.
These results show that when the public is uncertain about how the cen-
The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections 273
Fig. 6.4 Interest rate projections and the central bank losstral bank will respond to economic conditions, publishing interest rate pro-
jections can help align private and public expectations of future policy ac-
tions and thereby improve macroeconomic performance. This ﬁnding con-
ﬁrms that of Orphanides and Williams (2005), who, using a simple stylized
model, ﬁnd that the central bank loss is lower when the public knows the
monetary policy rule than if they have to estimate the policy rule based on
limited data.
6.4.2 Inﬂation Target Uncertainty
The case of policy rule uncertainty provides a strong case for central
bank transparency and the potential value of publishing central bank in-
terest rate projections. We now consider the case where the public is un-
certain regarding the true value of the medium-run inﬂation target.27 The
case of inﬂation target uncertainty is of particular interest for two reasons.
First, this case is of interest on its own merit. As discussed in Woodford
(2005) and Williams (2006), a central bank constrained by the zero lower
bound on interest rates will want to engineer above-trend inﬂation for a
time, but, if the public has little experience with policy constrained by the
zero bound, private agents may not understand the central bank’s inten-
tions. Second, this case is well suited for analyzing the issue of the eﬀects of
interest rate projections if the public ineﬃciently uses the information con-
tained in interest rate projections.
In analyzing inﬂation target uncertainty, we assume as before that the
public and the central bank have complete information regarding the other
aspects of the economy. We also continue to assume that the central bank
communicates in terms of a noisy one-period-ahead internal forecast of
the interest rate. And to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we now as-
sume that the public knows the central bank’s preference parameter  . Un-
der these assumptions, the public faces a standard signal extraction prob-
lem in order to try to disentangle the realizations of the inﬂation target and
the policy shock. One way to interpret the solution to this problem is to
consider what private agents will determine as the most likely value of the
true inﬂation target from realized policy actions and published central
bank interest rate projections. We assume that the central bank, but not the
public, knows the realized values of the two policy-related innovations, υt
and wt. The public observes the current interest rate, from which it can in-
fer the sum,  t
∗   wt, but it cannot disentangle the current level of the in-
ﬂation target and the realization of the policy shock wt. Likewise, from the
published interest rate projection, the public can infer the sum,   t
∗   ψzt,
where ψ measures the relationship between the inﬂation target and the in-
terest rate implied by the monetary policy rule, but it cannot disentangle
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27. For further discussion of target shocks in the context of public uncertainty of future
policy actions, see Faust and Svensson (2001) and Geraats (2005).the expected level of the inﬂation target and the realization of the trans-
mission noise shock, zt.28
Given the assumptions of independent Gaussian disturbances, the re-
sulting optimal ﬁlter estimate of the inﬂation target at time t, based on in-
formation available in period t, denoted by   ˆt
∗, is given by
(12)   ˆt
∗     ˆ
∗
t 1    ( t
∗   wt      ˆ
∗
t 1)    (  t
∗   ψzt      ˆ
∗
t 1),
where the parameter   ∈ [0, 1] is the gain associated with the revelation of
the policy action, and the parameter   ∈ [0, 1] is the gain associated with
the central bank’s projection of the interest rate in the next period. As
noted in the preceding, we assume that the unconditional mean of the in-
ﬂation target is 0 and that this is known by the public. We initially assume
that agents know the true values of the variances of the diﬀerent shocks
and ﬁlter the data optimally. Given that the shocks wt and zt are indepen-
dent, the signal-to-noise ratio of the combined two signals, denoted  , is
given by:
(13)       .
The optimal steady-state ﬁlter gains,  ∗ and  ∗, are given by the following
two equations:
(14)  ∗    ∗   1   ,
(15)  ∗   .
Equation (14) is the standard formula for a problem of two independent
Gaussian latent variables, where one follows an AR(1) and the other is se-
rially uncorrelated (see Harvey 1989). Equation (15) parses the sum of the
two gains according to the relative signal-to-noise ratios of the two pro-
cesses.
Private agents form expectations of future variables based on their esti-
mate of the inﬂation target. Output, inﬂation, and interest rates are then
determined conditional on these expectations. Figure 6.5 displays the op-
timal ﬁlter gains associated with the policy action,  ∗, and with the inter-
est rate projection,  ∗, respectively. Not surprisingly, if the central bank
signal of its policy intentions is highly noisy, the public mostly ignores that
signal and bases its beliefs primarily on policy actions. As the clarity of 
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28. The value of ψ is a function of the other model parameters. In the model simulations,
we ﬁrst obtain the reduced-form solution of the model and then set ψ equal to the inverse of
the coeﬃcient on the inﬂation target in the reduced-form equation for the interest rate.those projections and less weight on the current policy setting. As the
signal-to-noise goes to 0, the public optimally responds only to published
interest rate projections and not at all to policy actions.29
The public’s inaccurate assessments of the medium-run inﬂation target
create persistent discrepancies between the public’s estimate of the target
and the target’s true value, which distort the paths of inﬂation and the out-
put gap away from those desired by the central bank. Imperfect public in-
formation about the inﬂation target aﬀects the responses to shocks to the
policy rule and the inﬂation target. Given the relatively small variance as-
sumed for the inﬂation target shocks, sizable persistent shifts in the inﬂa-
tion target are relatively “rare,” so the public’s view of the inﬂation target is
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29. As in the case of policy rule uncertainty, if the central bank perfectly communicated its
expectation of the interest rate in the next period ( z 0), this information would be suﬃcient
for the public to completely ascertain the inﬂation target. Additional information from the
central bank about its projection of interest rates two, three, or more periods in the future
would be superﬂuous. However, as mentioned in the preceding, we interpret our analysis in
terms of providing signals on the projected path of interest rates over a few years.
Fig. 6.5 Inﬂation target uncertainty and the optimal use of informationnot very sensitive to a surprising policy action. Indeed, in the absence of in-
terest rate projections, the optimal gain parameter for policy actions,  ,
equals 0.043, indicating that the public’s estimate of the inﬂation target ini-
tially would rise only by 4.3 basis points in the period of a 1 percentage
point shock to the actual target.
The public’s misperception of the inﬂation target gradually shrinks over
time following a shock to the inﬂation target, both because the target itself
is returning to baseline and the public’s estimate is catching up with the tar-
get. With imperfect information, following a positive shock to the inﬂation
target, the public wrongly ascribes too much central bank behavior to the
transitory policy shock, so output rises more and inﬂation rises less than if
the public knew about the shift in the inﬂation target. The excessive rise in
the output gap continues and eventually causes the inﬂation rate to per-
sistently overshoot the true target. As a result, the loss associated with a
shock to the inﬂation target is greater when the central bank does not eﬀec-
tively communicate its intentions.
Although central bank communication helps improve the public’s un-
derstanding of the medium-run inﬂation target, it also potentially intro-
duces public expectational errors owing to central bank transmission noise
that otherwise would be absent. The noise in the interest rate signal distorts
the public’s expectations of future policy and is a source of aggregate vari-
ability. The magnitude of these misperceptions depends on both the vari-
ance of the transmission noise shocks and the ﬁlter gain applied by the
public to central bank communication. We account for this “cost” of noisy
transmissions in our calculation of the eﬀects of publishing interest rate
projections.
Publishing interest rate projections improves the public’s ability to dis-
cern the true medium-run inﬂation target, leading to better macroeco-
nomic outcomes. The solid line in ﬁgure 6.6 shows the central bank loss as
a function of the degree of central bank communication transmission
noise, assuming that the public uses the optimal ﬁlter described in the pre-
ceding. An increase in transparency achieves a better alignment of public
expectations of future policy with those of the central bank. The improved
management of expectations better aligns the economy’s responses to the
inﬂation target and policy shocks with those in the complete transparency
benchmark. On net, the beneﬁts of the public’s improved understanding of
the inﬂation target outweigh the costs of extra noise in the system resulting
from central bank communication noise, and the loss monotonically de-
creases as the quality of the signal about the central bank’s interest rate
projection improves. The beneﬁts of transparency are larger when the in-
ﬂation target is highly persistent. The smaller beneﬁt of communication
when the inﬂation target is not very persistent reﬂects the fact that in this
situation the responses of the economy to an inﬂation target shock and a
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sources of the shock has little eﬀect on inﬂation and output and, therefore,
on the central bank loss.
6.4.3 Possible Public Confusion Regarding the Interest Rate Projections
One concern about central bank provision of interest rate projections is
that private agents may misconstrue the accuracy of these projections or
view them as unconditional commitments of future policy actions on the
part of the central bank. If private agents systematically underreact to in-
terest rate projections, the eﬀects and usefulness of those projections would
be more muted than reported in the preceding. A more signiﬁcant concern
is that private agents might overreact to published statements of central
bank intentions and thereby underreact to the information in policy ac-
tions, with potentially deleterious eﬀects on the economy. Such misper-
ceptions of the quality of the central bank projections should not persist
indeﬁnitely because agents will eventually deduce the true value of central
bank information from observed data. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that
misperceptions of the noise in the central bank published projections could
persist for a signiﬁcant period of time and, therefore, be a problem during
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Fig. 6.6 Inﬂation target uncertainty and the central bank lossa transition period following the initial publication of interest rate projec-
tions. For this reason, we consider the eﬀects of public confusion as to the
degree of transmission noise in central bank rate projections.
If the public systematically underestimates the accuracy of the central
bank interest rate projections, then the beneﬁts of central bank communi-
cation are muted. The dashed line in ﬁgure 6.6 shows the central bank
losses for diﬀerent degrees of noise in the central bank projections, where
the public ﬁlters the incoming information from policy actions and inter-
est rate projections and believes that the central bank is sending a signal
with  z   0.25. The portion of the curve corresponding to values of  z be-
tween 0 and 0.25 is nearly ﬂat, indicating that achieving the beneﬁts of cen-
tral bank communication of rate projections depends critically on the
public’s knowledge of the quality of the signal.
Interestingly, in the intermediate case where the public only moderately
overestimates the accuracy of the central bank’s signal, the central bank
loss is actually lower than if the public had correctly assessed the degrees
of transmission noise. Thus, for a given degree of transmission noise, the
central bank loss is actually reduced when private agents ineﬃciently use
information in forming expectations. This result reﬂects the net eﬀects of
the eﬀects of target misperceptions on the responses to the diﬀerent
shocks. The overestimate of the accuracy of the central bank signal reduces
the loss following a shock to the target because it reduces the mispercep-
tions in that case. The same result holds for the responses to transitory pol-
icy shocks, in which case the public’s mistaken belief that the shock reﬂects
in small part a shift in the inﬂation target can lead to a small reduction in
the loss associated with the shock. Oﬀsetting these gains is the increase in
aggregate variability owing directly to the responses of output and inﬂa-
tion to the noise in the central bank signal. On net, in this model, the gains
exceed the costs for moderate degrees of overestimation of the quality of
the signal. This ﬁnding illustrates the more general point that there does
not exist an exact universal correspondence between the alignment of
private and public expectations and the minimization of the central bank
loss.30 Under certain conditions, systematic expectational errors can be
beneﬁcial to the achievement of the central bank’s goals, while in other
cases such errors can interfere with the achievement of those goals.
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30. It is possible to devise other examples where an improved alignment of private and cen-
tral bank expectations increases the central bank loss. For example, if one allows for both a
transitory shock to the true inﬂation target that has a signiﬁcantly higher variance than either
the persistent inﬂation target or the policy shocks, then either partial transparency or even no
transparency can be optimal. This occurs because the public sees some probability that any
realized shock is highly persistent, which causes inﬂation to rise more and the output gap to
move less than for a transitory shock, both desirable responses if the source of the shock is a
transitory disturbance to the inﬂation target. Such an example is not realistic, but illustrates
the general point that has been made repeatedly in the literature: transparency can be a
double-edged sword.Nonetheless, it is worth stressing that in the examples considered here, we
ﬁnd that the central bank loss is minimized when the central bank is per-
fectly transparent, that is,  z   0.
If the public severely overestimates the accuracy of central bank signals,
then publishing interest rate projections can be counterproductive, until
private agents realize their misperception of the accuracy of central bank
signals. As the degree of the public’s overestimation of the accuracy of the
signal increases, the loss associated with aggregate ﬂuctuations resulting
from the responses to noise in the central bank’s signal rises. As seen in the
ﬁgure, if the true value of  z exceeds about 1.25, while the public believes it
to be 0.25, the central bank loss exceeds that which would occur if the cen-
tral bank did not publish interest rate projections at all. Under this condi-
tion, the costs associated with the public’s response to the noise generated
by the central bank signals outweigh the beneﬁts these signals provide in
the responses to the other shocks.
The potential for misperceptions of the accuracy of the interest rate pro-
jections suggests that an important part of such communication is to avoid
sending highly noisy signals of future policy intentions that confuse mar-
kets. Indeed, concern that communication of policy intentions was doing
more harm than good appears to have been behind the FOMC’s abandon-
ment of policy guidance in 1999, as discussed in the preceding. But in the
cases of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank, publica-
tion of interest rate projections does not appear to have led to excessive or
counterproductive market reactions. Moreover, as evidenced by the devia-
tions of market expectations from the RBNZ interest rate projections il-
lustrated in ﬁgure 6.1, it is clear that market participants do not view the
projections as unconditional commitments, nor do they forsake indepen-
dent analysis of economic conditions and forecasting of policy.
6.5 Conclusion
Indirect signaling of future policy intentions has been the overwhelming
choice of central banks in the past. Recently, however, some central banks,
including the Fed, have revealed some information to the public about
their future policy intentions. But only two central banks, the RBNZ and
the Norges Bank, have gone so far as to provide explicit quantitative fore-
casts of the policy expectations. The existing theoretical literature has not
focused on transparency with regard to interest rate projections, nor has it
reached ﬁrm conclusions regarding the optimal degree of central bank
transparency in general. In our theoretical analysis, we ﬁnd that central
bank communication of interest rate projections can better align the
public’s and the central bank’s expectations, and this better alignment of
expectations generally leads to improvements in macroeconomic perfor-
mance.
280 Glenn D. Rudebusch and John C. WilliamsAlthough our results provide some support for the argument that the
better alignment of expectations improves performance, our analysis also
highlights some of the pitfalls that may accompany publishing interest rate
projections. An important concern is that the public would misconstrue
the central bank communication as providing an unconditional commit-
ment or may put too much weight on the information from the central
bank communication relative to other sources of information. We ﬁnd that
the latter concern, if realized, could be costly in terms of macroeconomic
stabilization and could even cause performance to worsen relative to the
case of no central bank communication. These results underline the need
for a well-developed central bank communications strategy that mitigates
such problems by highlighting both the conditionality and uncertainty re-
garding interest rate projections.
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Comment Marvin Goodfriend
On May 3, 2006, the Wall Street Journal carried a front page story and 
an editorial about Federal Reserve guidance for markets on interest rate
policy.1 Confusion about the Federal Reserve’s intentions for interest rates
occurs from time to time and this episode is just the latest of many that have
occurred in the past. What I would call “rhetoric risk” is an inevitable part
of monetary policy accompanied by communications intended to provide
markets with guidance about the future direction of short-term interest
rates.
This chapter addresses an important practical question that is closely re-
lated to rhetoric risk: is it desirable for a central bank to release its projec-
tion of the future path of its interest rate policy instrument? Essentially, the
chapter investigates whether publishing an interest rate forecast would en-
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1. See Ip (2006) and Wall Street Journal (2006).able the public to improve its inference of private central bank information
relevant for monetary policy and thereby improve the eﬀectiveness of mon-
etary policy.
The chapter addresses this question in a conventional model of mone-
tary policy in which the forward-looking IS function contains a shock to
the natural rate of interest, and the forward-looking aggregate supply func-
tion contains a shock to real marginal cost.
The policy function in the model, which is the ﬁrst-order condition for
optimal monetary policy, contains two more shocks. First, there is a ﬁrst-
order autoregressive shock to the medium-run inﬂation target. The credi-
bility of the central bank’s long-run inﬂation target implicitly is assumed to
be fully secure, ruling out the possibility of inﬂation drift in the model. The
public understands that at any point in time the actual inﬂation target may
deviate persistently, though not permanently, from the long-run inﬂation
target. Second, there is a policy shock to current inﬂation, given the cur-
rent inﬂation target and the current output gap in the policy function. In
addition, the model allows for the public to be imprecisely aware of the pa-
rameter that weights the central bank’s concern for inﬂation relative to out-
put in the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy.
The authors assume that the public and the central bank have accurate,
complete, contemporaneous information about the structural parameters
of the private economy. Both observe perfectly and contemporaneously
the current shock to the natural rate of interest and the current shock to
real marginal cost. There is no data processing lag in the model.
The authors use the model to consider the consequences of publication
by the central bank each period of a noisy forecast of future short-term in-
terest rates conditional on the central bank’s private information and the
central bank’s optimized policy. They consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case,
the central bank publicizes its medium-run inﬂation target exactly, but
keeps secretthe parameter in its optimal policy rule that governs the cost of
inﬂation relative to output. In the second case, the central bank keeps se-
cret its medium-run inﬂation target, but publicizes the parameter in its op-
timal policy rule relating inﬂation to output. In both cases, the central
bank is presumed to keep secretthe policy shock to current inﬂation, given
the current inﬂation target and the current output gap.
In each case, the public in the model is assumed to infer optimally as-
pects of the policy rule that are kept secret. The main ﬁnding of the chap-
ter emphasized by the authors is that the release of a projection for future
short-rates can improve macroeconomic performance in both cases.
One can regard the chapter as a study of the extent to which the release
of a noisy projected path for short-term interest rates conditioned on the
information set of the central bank can substitute productively for trans-
parency about the parameter relating inﬂation to output in the optimal
policy rule or transparency about the medium-run inﬂation target.
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The chapter references research that reports empirical evidence of sig-
niﬁcant variation in the medium-run inﬂation target and signiﬁcant per-
sistence of the medium inﬂation target. One might question the identiﬁca-
tion of the statistical process generating an (implicit) inﬂation target in
historical data. In any case, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that
going forward, the innovation variance and persistence of the inﬂation tar-
get might be much smaller now that inﬂation has been stabilized around a
relatively low rate. On this basis, the model could be expected to overstate
the quantitative improvement in macroeconomic performance that could
be yielded by releasing interest rate projections when the medium-run in-
ﬂation target is kept secret.
Furthermore, the model provides no reason why a central bank should
keep its medium-term inﬂation target secret in the ﬁrst place. Agents would
prefer to have direct knowledge of the central bank’s medium-run inﬂation
target in making their decisions. The same goes for the parameter weight-
ing the cost of inﬂation relative to output in the policy rule. The model gives
no reason why these policy variables should not be publicized, especially
as publication would improve welfare in the model.
That said, I believe that in practice the public would continue to face a
nontrivial signal processing problem with respect to central bank private
information, even if policy were made more transparent as in the preced-
ing. In practice, interest rate policy actions depend in part on multiple, im-
perfectly correlated inputs that the public does not observe. For instance,
central banks have networks—regional, ﬁnancial/supervisory, small busi-
ness, industrial, and international—that feed information into the policy
process. Central banks devote enormous resources to measuring and un-
derstanding the evolution of these inputs and a range of other data, aggre-
gate and otherwise. Central banks continually update comprehensive fore-
casting models through which they process their thinking about the
economy in a consistent way.
The preceding factors may do no more than give a central bank a tem-
porary lead over ﬁnancial markets, academics, other private observers,
and the media in recognizing developments in the economy. Yet such con-
siderations plausibly enable central banks to stay enough ahead of out-
siders in understanding the economy to maintain an information advan-
tage relative to the public in any given period.
In principle, one can imagine that a central bank might convey directly
to the public information from the diverse sources mentioned in the pre-
ceding. However, doing so would be diﬃcult and inadvisable. Much infor-
mation could be acquired only on a conﬁdential basis and might not be
provided to the central bank in as much detail or at all if made public.
Moreover, a central bank might be inclined not to divulge its views on par-
ticular industries so as not to interfere with individual markets. Moreover,
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ing services for the public to understand how the central bank utilizes
much of its detailed information productively. An alternative is for a cen-
tral bank to make its information available in a package, embodied in reg-
ular comprehensive assessments of current economic conditions, involving
forecasts and discussion of how outcomes of key macroeconomic variables
such as inﬂation, output, and interest rates are expected to evolve over
time.
Reinterpreting the source of central bank private information along the
preceding lines, the model suggests that it may make sense for a central
bank to publish its interest rate projections. At a minimum, however, the
model suggests also that a central bank should publish those parts of its
private information that are feasible to publish and that are readily under-
stood and interpreted by the public, such as a medium-run inﬂation target.
Recall that the model implicitly assumes that there is a ﬁxed, known long-
run inﬂation target.
In closing, I would like to emphasize that if a central bank chooses to
publicize its interest rate projection, it should present that projection as
part of a comprehensive economic forecast that recognizes the intercon-
nectedness of the economy and interest rate policy. In particular, interest
rates should be understood to be a forward-looking stabilizing force in the
macroeconomy, reacting to and oﬀsetting prospective macroeconomic
forces that would otherwise destabilize inﬂation, employment, and output.
Central bank forecasts should give a coherent, consistent reﬂection of a
central bank’s overall view of current and prospective macroeconomic
conditions. A central bank should be careful to steer clear of statements
about particular sectors of the economy that could draw it into partisan
disputes about prospects in particular markets. Above all, forecasts in gen-
eral, and interest rate projections in particular, should be understood to be
exceedingly fragile. Interest rates are among the ﬁrst macroeconomic vari-
ables to react to emerging macroeconomic forces. The market’s estimates
of prospective developments are revised frequently over time with the po-
tential for sizable interest rate adjustments.
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Glenn D. Rudebusch said that, in principle, the central bank could send a
signal of its medium-term inﬂation target  ∗ as an alternative to sending a
signal of its projection of the next period’s interest rate, the case considered
in the chapter—however, the fact that there was not a lot of variation in  ∗
made this a less desirable option.
Peter Westawaysaid that the Bank of England presented economic fore-
casts based on the assumption that interest rates will follow the market for-
ward rate path, rather than, say, assuming that interest rates will remain
constant. It thereby avoided having to make assumptions about the impli-
cations of diﬀerent paths for asset prices and having to model learning.
Lars E.O. Svensson commented that modeling learning is indeed diﬃcult,
but central banks are used to modeling sluggish or irrational expectations,
and should do so in this case, as they do in others.
Laurence H. Meyer noted that although the chapter discussed secrets of
the temple in the sense of secrets between the central bank and public, he
thought that, in fact, there were secrets inside the temple. Not all those in-
volved in monetary policy were equally well informed. As a matter of se-
quencing, he said that central banks tended to make the decision to make
announcements of the type considered by Rudebusch and John C.
Williams only after making the decision to target inﬂation. He also said
that although the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provided a
forecast of future conditions, it did not reveal the policy response that un-
derpinned that forecast. Doing so would be desirable.
There was some discussion of the possibility that a central bank might
lose credibility if it projected interest rates in a manner that subsequently
turned out to be inaccurate. Rudebusch argued that the experience of Nor-
way was encouraging in this regard. Svensson concurred, saying that he
had conducted a review of monetary policy in New Zealand. In the course
of preparing that review, he had not encountered any complaints about
poor forecasts. The same was true in Norway. Thomas Laubach, however,
expressed the view that central banks would not like to deviate from pro-
jections that they had previously published, and Charles Engel worried
that a less credible central bank than the Fed might get into trouble if the
environment changed and the bank did not move interest rates along the
previously forecast path.
DonaldL.Kohnsuggested that the key issue was the correct model of the
economy. People wanted to know what the central bank thought was go-
ing on and what it thought was going to happen. Communication was
more a question of conveying the big picture. Ideally, then, the private sec-
tor would weigh central bank information and react to it. Over the last two
years, Federal Reserve eﬀorts to provide information had worked better
288 Glenn D. Rudebusch and John C. Williamsthan many expected. But, he said, the last two months showed that as the
economy approached an inﬂexion point, it was hard to convey uncertainty
and conditionality appropriately. The FOMC members worried that if they
surprised the markets, stability could be negatively aﬀected. Nonetheless,
although there was some reticence, FOMC members were generally favor-
able to the idea of increased communication.
Andrew Levin pointed out that Norwegian data showed an important
diﬀerence between central bank and private-sector forecasts. Communica-
tion of this fact could foster conversation about why the two disagree.
Based on work carried out on New Zealand, it appeared that changes in
the policy rate path only had a minimal eﬀect on futures prices. This sug-
gested that revealing the policy rate path might have only marginal impact.
Martin Schneider noted that in the interesting case where there was dis-
agreement between the forecasts of the central bank and the private sector,
the central bank and private sector apparently had diﬀerent beliefs about
how the world works. Perhaps, he said, this has implications for the central
bank loss function.
Brian Sacksaid that the importance of releasing both macro projections
and policy forecasts was that together they helped the private sector to
learn about both the central bank’s loss function and the state of the econ-
omy. He suggested that one might push this further and ask what the cen-
tral bank’s forecasts were for equity prices or for the price of oil. How far
should this be taken? One option might be to report a policy rate forecast
conditional on a particular macro path. Finally, he thought that the mar-
ket should be given credit for understanding the diﬃculties inherent in
forecasting.
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